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Communication  from  the Commission  to  the Council 
I.  lntroduct ton 
1.  On  16  June  1988,  the  Italian  Government  advised  the  Commission 
of  a  plan  to  restructure  the  /tal ian  pub/ ic  steel  Industry. 
Starting  with  the  winding-up  of  the  parent  company,  Flnslder, 
and  its  main  steel  subsidiaries,  the  plan  comprises  a  number  of 
industrial,  commercial,  financial  and  social  measures  which 
should  allow  a  new  steel  entity,  ILVA,  to  achieve,  from  1990, 
adequate  operating  results  to ensure viability. 
AccordIng  to  the  It  a I I an  Government_,  the  Imp I ement at ion  of  the 
plan  wi II  ental I  a  total  financial  cost  of  Lit  7  670  thousand 
million1  for  the  present  public  shareholder  of  Finslder, 
namely,  the state holding company  IRI.  Insofar  as  the  financing 
is  intended  to  make  It  possible  to  create  ILVA  by,  on  the  one 
hand,  repaying  the  Flnslder  debts  that  cannot  be  covered  from 
the  proceeds  of  the  winding-up  of  certain  assets,  and  on  the 
other  hand,  by  covering certain operating  losses  which  Finsider 
would  continue  to  Incur  during  the  winding-up  procedure,  the 
Commission  is  obliged  to  take  the  view  that  the  measures 
comprise  aid  elements  and  are  therefore  incompatible  with 
Article  4(c)  of  the  ECSC  Treaty  and  with  the  provisions  of 
Decision  No  3484185/ECSC  of 27  November  1985. 
Consequently,  the  financing,  insofar  as  It  will  be  necessary 
can  be  authorized  only  If  the  Commission  adopts  a  derogation 
decision  which,  under  Article  95  of  the  ECSC  Treaty,  requires 
ECU  4,950 million - 2-
the  unanimous  assent  of  the  Counci I,  after  the  Consultative 
Comm i t tee /1as  been  cons  u I ted . 
11.  current  financial  status of Finslder 
2.  The  Commission  continues  to  believe  that  a  steel  undertaking 
cannot  hope  to  attain  lasting  financial  viability  if  it  cannot 
achieve,  under  normal  market  conditions,  an  annual  gross 
operating  result  of  13%  of  turnover,  taking  account  of  NnormaiN 
f i nanc i a I  charges  and  deprecIations,  i . e.  4. 5%  and  7% 
respectively of turnover. 
A:.>  in  the  case  of  other  Community  steel  producers,  it  was  only 
after  an  expert  financial  report  had  certified  that  Finsider·s 
1984  restructuring  plan  was  capable  of  achieving  this  result 
subject  to  Industrial,  financial  and  social  restructuring,  that 
the Commission  authorized  the  gran~ of  aid  to  the Group. 
In  1987,  however,  Finsider's  gross  operating  profit  was  only 
2.5%  of  turnover,  and  Its  financial  charges  which  shoul1t  have 
been  reduced  to  4.6%  by early  7986,  amounted  to  8.2%.  Its  net 
losses  thus  totalled  Lit  1  700  thousand  mi II ion  (or  17%  of 
turnover),  an  Increase  of  Lit  950  thousand  million  over  7986. 
Total  debts  for  the whole Finsider  Group,  including  EEC  and  ECSC 
subsidiaries,  reached  Lit  10  030  thousand  million by  the  end of 
1987,  i.e.  104%  of consolidated turnover. 
It  should  be  noted  that  Flnslder's  flat  products  subsidiary, 
ltalsider,  alone  accounts  for  58%  of  total  turnover  (Lit  6  400 
thousand  mi II ion  out  of  Lit  11  000  thousand  mi II Jon),  and  for 
Lit  000  thousand  mi II ion  of  the  Group's  losses  in  1987. 
ltalsider  was  thus  the  only  Community  flat  products'  producer2 
2  With  the  exception  of  Spanish  undertakings  undergoing  extensive 
restructuring. - 3  -
not  to have obtained  a  gross  profit  In  1987  close to  the  minimum 
'  threshold  fixed  by  the Commission. 
The  Group's  Inability to continue  to  finance  its activities  from 
own  resources  compelled  it  to  have  Increasing  recourse  to  bank 
loans  from  1986  onwards,  which  resulted  In  the  further 
deterioration of  its  financial  structure  and  was  the  subject  of 
a  Commission  proceeding  under  Article  88  of  the  ECSC  Treaty. 
The  Commission  considered  that  the  loans  could  not  have  been 
obtained without  the  implicit  guarantee  given by  the State which 
thus  constituted  a  State  aid  contrary  to  Article  4(c)  of  the 
ECSC  Treaty. 
3.  Finally,  on  70  May  7988,  a  general  shareholders'  meeting  (the 
IRI  has  a  99.8%  stake  in  Ffnsider)  decided  on  the  voluntary 
winding-up  of  the  holding  company  Finsider  and  its  main  steel 
subsidiaries.  This  operation,  to  which  the  Commission  extended 
its  infringement  proceeding  referred  to  above,  means  that  the 
IRI  and  its shareholder,  the  Italian State,  are guaranteeing  the 
Group's  creditors,  this  time  explicitly,  that  the  principal  and 
interest  on  their  loans will  be  repaid. 
At  the  same  time,  and  in  agreement  with  the  Italian Government, 
the  Commission  appointed  a  panel  of  experts  to  analyse  the 
reasons  for  the  failure of  the  restructuring  plan  authorized  In 
1985.  Concern  at  the  failure  was  heightened  by  the  fact  that, 
whilst  Finsider  was  undergoing  major  structural  changes, 
notably  In  the  form of capacity cuts  (-23,6% of  the capacity of 
hot-rolled products  of  1980)  and  redundancies  (employment  cut  by 
43  200  persons,  i.e.  -32%%  in  relation  to  1980),  it  was  also 
receiving  Lit  12  000  thousand  million  in  aid  between  1980  and 
1985,  i.e.  27%  of  the  total  aid  granted  In  that  period  to  tr.e 
steel  industry  In  the  Community  of Ten. 
As  could  have  been  expected,  particularly  in  relation  to  the 
performance  of  Finsider's  main  competitors,  the  analysis - 4-
revealed  that  the  failure  was  not  due  to  outside  circumstances 
such  as  price  trends  or  production  votumes3  in  relation  to 
estimates,  but  Indeed  to  a  still  Insufficiently  competitive 
Industrial  and  commercial  structure,  delays  In  the 
implementation  of  Investments  and  to  insufficiently  rigorous 
management. 
111.  Restructuring plan of  the  Italian Government 
4.  Industrial  aspects 
As  pari  of  the  winding-up  procedure.  the  Ita/ ian  plan  divides 
Flnslltct 's  cxlstlfl(}  activities  lflto  thtc<' ccttcoorlcs: 
4.1  ECSC  and  non-ECSC  steel  activities  which  are  or  will  be 
profitable  will  be  transferred  to  a  new  company  *ILVA·,  whose 
sole  shareholder  will,  at  least  initially,  continue  to  be 
Finsider.  The  activities  to  be  transferred  are  those  of 
ltalslder  (flat  products  manufactured  chiefly at  the  integrated 
pi ant  at  Taranto),  Deltas ider  (long  products,  integrated  pi ant 
at  Plombino),  Dalmine  (pipes  and  tubes),  TDI  (pipes  and  tubes) 
and  Tern/  (stainless steels). 
4.2  Steel  activities  whose  profitability  within  ILVA  cannot  be 
guaranteed  wi II  either  be  closed  down  or  sold  to  the  private 
sector. 
3  Even  though  overall,  Finsider  achieved  its  planned  targets  in 
1984,  Italy's  intra-Community  trade  position  was  declining 
particularly  in  flat  products  (1984:  -2,1  million  tonnes;  1986: 
-1,9 million  tonnes;  1987:  -2,3 million tonnes). - 5  -
4.2.1  The  plants  to be closed  in  any  event  are: 
Production capacities  (in  thousand  tonnes) 
Bagnol i 
Campi  (heavy  plate) 
Turin  (merchant  bars.  wire  rod) 
Terni  (concrete  reinforcing bars) 
Sesto  S.  Giovanni  (merchant  bars, 
wire  rod) 
Turin 
TOTAL 
Iron  Steel 
2  350  2  700 
350 
375 
2  350  3  425 
·-
Hot- Cofd-





1  180 
_?2§_ 
708 
4.2.2 Plant  covered  by  the  ECSC  Treaty  to  be  sold  to  the  private 
sector,  or  to be operated  in conjunction with  the  fatter,  is  as 
follows: 
Production  capacity (in  thousand  tonnes) 
I ron  Steel  Hot- Cold-
rolled  rolled 
Aosta  (Cogne)(merchant  bars,wire  rod)  460  65 
Marghera  (heavy  and  I i ght  sections)  130 
s.  Giov.  Valdarno  (light  sections)  150 
Sisma  (heavy  and  I ight  sect ions.  240  230 
wire  rod) 
Trieste  590 
Lovere  145 
TOTAL  590  845  575 - 6  -
4.2.3  The  plan  submitted  by  the  Italian  Government  comprises  a 
timetable  for  these closures  and  transfers starting  from  the  end 
of  1988  to  the  end  of  1990  (and  even  after  1990  in  some 
instances,  e.g.  the Aosta plant). 
4.3  Finsider's  non-steel  activities  (e.g.  Cementir  (cement), 
ltalimpianti  (engineering))  will  be  sold  to  third  parties  or  to 
the  IRI.  The  proceeds  from  the  sale  of  these  activities  whose 
value  is being or  will  be assessed by  independent  experts during 
the  wind f ng-up  procedure,  w  i I I  be  used  to  reduce  Fins i der · s 
debts. 
4.4  The  Italian  Government's  plan  will  be  accompanied  by  employment 
cuts  of  19  915  persons  from  a  total  of  70  340  persons,  i.e.  a 
reduction of 28,3%. 
4.5  Bagnoli- a  special  case 
The  Ita/ ian  plan  provides  in  principle  for  the  closure  of  the 
upstream  phase  (iron  and  steel)  at  Bagnol i  by  no  I ater  than 
1 July  1989.  the  wide  strip  mi II  would  then  be  incorporated 
into  'tLVA's  activities;  production  would  vary,  depending  on  the 
quantitative  and  qualitative  development  of  demand,  the 
utilization  rate  necessary  to  ensure  profitability  of  the  wide 
strip  mill  at  Taranto  and  the  probable  market  for  its 
products4. 
5.  Financial  aspects 
The  implementation  of  the  Italian  restructuring  plan  would 
entail  a  maximum  financial  contribution  from  the  IRI  of  Lit 
7  670  thousand  m  iII ion  ( 4  950  m  iII ion  ECU),  broken  down  as 
fOil OWS: 
4  The  number  of  employees  at  Bagnoli  would  then  decrease  from  3816 
(1987)  to 850. - 7  -
5.1  Aid for  financial  restructuring 
Total  liabilities  incurred  by  Finslder  at  1.10.1988  amount  to 
Lit  10  517  thousand  million,  corresponding  to  debts  of 
Lit  10  030  thousand  million  and  interest  of  Lit  487  thousand 
million (see  point  5.1). 
The  liabilities will  be  absorbed  as  follows: 
-transfers  of  steel  and  non-steel  assets:  Lit  1  500  thousand 
m  i I I I on; 
taking  over  by  /LVA,  in  exchange  for  the  steel  assets 
transferred  by  Finsider,  of  part  of  the  1 iabi I it ies:  Lit  2  085 
thousand million: 
- taking  over  by  the  State,  either  directly  or  through  IRI,  the 
public shareholder,  of Lit  6  932  thousand  million. 
5.2 Contingency  fund 
A  maximum  of  Lit  288  thousand  million  has  been  set  aside  in  the 
event  of  transfers  not  reaching  the expected selling prices. 
5.3 Other  operating aid 
The  aid  of  Lit  245  thousand  million  is  intended  to  cover  the 
deficit  incurred  by  the  provisional  management  of  the 
install  at ions  to  be  closed  or  transferred  in  due  course  to  the 
private  sector  (the  installations  described  in  point .4.2  and  the 
Bagnoli  plant).  With  the  exception  of  Aosta,  the  plan  provides 
for  a  timetable  of  closures  and  transfers  starting  at  the  end  of 
1988  and  finishing  end  1990. 
5.4 Aid for  closures 
This  concerns  Lit  205  thousand  million of  aid  for  social  purposes 
(contributions  to  the  pension  fund  and  the  NCassa  lntegrazioneN 
(Wage  Guarantee Fund). - 8  -
5.5 The  Commission  Decision  would  thus  concern  a  total  of  Lit  7  670 
thousand million  in State aids. 
The  total  appropriation  Includes  several.  Items  which  at  this 
stage  are  only  Interim  evaluations  to  be  regarded  as  maximum 
amounts.  The  amounts  finally  authorized  by  the  Commission  w/11 
have  to  be  justified  and  checked  throughout  the  winding-up  of 
Flnslder  and  the start-up of  ILVA. 
IV.  Position of  the  Commission  as  regards  the  operation  proposed  in 
the  plem  presented by  the  Italian Government 
6  The  Italian  initiative amounts  to  the  granting of State  aids  to 
the  Italian public steel  industry 
6.1  As  the  Commission  already  made  clear  in  its  arguments  for  the 
Article  88  ECSC  procedure  it  opened  against,  on  the  one  hand, 
the  Increase  in  Finsider's  debts  in  1987  and,  on  the  other,  the 
guarantee  given  to  Finsider's  creditors  by  the  ~voluntary 
winding-up~  decision,  it  considers  that  the  transfer  of 
resources  from  IRI  to  Finsider  must  be  regarded  as  comprising 
aid  elements  that  are  contrary  to  Article  4(c)  of  the  ECSC 
Treaty,  for  the  following  reasons: 
the  IRI  would  have  been  unable  to  take  a  decision  of  this 
importance  without  the  encouragement  and  possibly  the 
financial  support  of  its shareholder,  the State; 
carrying out  Its  financial  commitment  of Lit  7  670  thousand 
million  to  Finsider  (see  point  5)  would  leave  the  IRI 
without  any  own  capital  (which  amounts  only  to  Lit  7  760 
thousand million); 
since  1947,  IRI  has  received  a  total  of Lit  21  600  thousand 
mi Ilion  in  capital  contributions  from  the  State;  of  that 
amount,  Lit  13  840  thousand  ml II ion  (of  which  Lit. 9  240 
thousand  million  went  to  Finsider  in  7982-86)  were  used  to 
to offset  the  losses  incurred by subsidiaries. - 9  -
the  IRI  will  not  find  on  the  capital  markets  the  financing 
required  to  cover  Its  commitments  In  view  of  both  Its 
considerable debts  (70%  of  invested capital)  and  its results 
In  the  past,  w/ thout  the  guarantee. of  the  State  which  it 
enjoys. 
In  this context,  IRI's  commitment  cannot  be  regarded  as  the 
-normal·  behaviour  of  a  private  Investor;  the  Italian  State 
and  IRI  In  fact  acted  jointly. 
6.2  It  Is  also  clear  that  without  the  proposed  financial 
restructuring,  Finsider  would  be unable  to continue  in ousiness. 
It  would  be  condemned  to  bankruptcy,  and  its  best  assets  would 
probably  have  to  be  broken  up  and  sold  rather  than  grouped 
together  under  ILVA,  whose  only  means  of  purchasing  them  is 
through  the combined  Intervention of the  IRI  and  the State. 
6.3  IRI's  financial  commitment,  which  will  In  the  more  or  less 
distant  future  require  at  least  partial  financing  by  the  State, 
thus  at  the  very  least  comprises  elements  of  State  aid  and  is 
covered  by  the  ban  In  Article 4(3)  of  the  ECSC  Treaty  inasmuch 
as  it  does  not  meet  any  of  the  conditions  for  exemption  under 
Commission  Decision  No  3484185/ECSC. 
The  Commission  therefore  considers  that  where  the  plan  to 
restructure  the  Italian  public  steel  industry  concerns  the 
creation  of  ILVA,  It  should  at  least  meet  the  criteria  set  by 
the Commission  for  its examination of the restructuring  plans of 
various  Community  steel  undertakings  which  received  aid  between 
1981  and  1985.  Experience  has  shown  that  the  criteria  can 
ensure  a  return  to  financial  viability,  provided  that  all  the 
restructuring  measures  contained  in  the  programmes  are 
implemented  in  accordance  with  the  timetable  and  conditions 
agreed  on  by  the Member  States  and  the undertakings. 
The  Commission  will  ensure  that  the  aid  it  authorizes  in  its 
Decision  does  not  benefit  any  steel  subsidiaries  not  covered  by 
the  ECSC  Treaty.  Should  such  aid  elements  appear,  they  will  be - 10  -
examined  In  relation  to  and  within  the  framework  of  the 
provisions  and  procedures  of  Articles  92  et  seq.  of  the  EEC 
Treaty.  The  Commission  has  already  opened  the  Article  93(2) 
procedure  against  a  recent  subscription  of  new  capital  by 
Finsider  In  Dalmine,  a  pipe  and  tube  manufacturer.  The 
Commission  will  thus  a/so  ensure  that  the  latter's  liabilities 
are  not  affected  by  the  financial  transfers  which  form  the 
subject of this communication. 
7.  CondltiOQS  the Commission  Intends  to attach to  Its authorization 
of the State aids 
In  the  view  of  the  Commission,  authorization  of  the  aid  in 
question  should  In  any  event  be  subject  to  the  simultaneous 
fulfilment  of  three  major  conditons,  which  correspond  to  the 
position  it  adopted  between  1981  and  1986.  They  consist  of: 
checks  that  the  measures  envisaged  in  the  plan  are  capable 
of making  ILVA  financially viable; 
limiting  the  amount  of  the  aids  to  what  is  strictly 
necessary; 
a  reciprocal  concession,  notably  in  the  form  of  hot-rolled 
capacity cuts,  commensurate with  the  amount  of the  financing 
in question. 
7.1  Financial  viability of  ILVA 
7.1 .1  The  Commission  and  the  /tal ian  Government  jcfnt /y  appointed  a 
panel  of  Independent  experts  to  examine  ILVA's  viabi I ity 
prospects.  Their  assessment  was  based  on  criteria  identical  to 
those  already  Imposed  by  the  Commission  during  the  previous 
restructuring of the Community  steel  industry,  namely: 
the  taking  into  account  for  the  period  1988-1990  of  a 
hypothetical  trend  in  production  costs  and  selling  prices - 11  -
similar  to  that  adopted  at  the  time  (i.e.  a  cost-price 
squeeze effect of -2.5%  a  year): 
8  minimum  depreciation  level  of 7%  In  order  to  guarantee  the 
continuation  or  the  replacement  of  the  activities  on  which 
ILVA's  viability  Is  based; 
a  level  of  financial  charges  not  lower  than  4.5%  of 
turnover,  a  level  which  all  correctly  managed  firms  should 
attain.  In  order  to  reduce state aid  to  the strict minimum, 
the  Commission  had  already  made  the  same  demands  on  those 
firms  granted  additional  aid  in  1985  authorized  under 
Commission  Decision  No  1018!85/Ecsc5,  as  well  as  on  Spanish 
and  Portuguese  firms. 
a  minimum  return  (1-1.5%  of turnover)  on  own  capital  so  that 
whether  the capital  stems  from  public or  private sources,  it 
produces  a  fair  yield,  ensuring  that  there  is  no 
discrimination  between  public and  private undertakings: 
realistic sales  prospects  in  ret at ion  both  to  the  estimates 
of  the  1990  general  steel  objectives  and  to  the  1986  and 
1987  results.  In  this  respect,  unlike  the·  Government  plan 
which,  in spite of an  overall  drop  in sales of more  than  one 
mi II ion  tonnes  against  1986,  anticipates  a  300  000  tonne 
increase  in  sales  by  the  Ita/ ian  public  steel  industry  on 
the  Community  market,  the  Commission  has  taken  the  same 
sales  figures  as  for  1986  and  1987  into  account  for  its 
viability assessment,  as  follows: 






5  OJ  No  L110,  23.4.1985. 
1986 
11  032 
8  406 
2  626 
thousand  tonnes 
1987 
10  790 
8  420 
2  370 
1990(1) 
9  664 
B  400 
264 - 12  -




7.1 .2 According  to 
restructuring 
the  experts' 
follows  the 
thousand  tonnes 
10  003 
8  739 
1  264 
analysis,  and  provided 
timetable  and  every 
that  the 
possible 
rationalization  is  introduced,  the gross operating result  should 
rise  fr~m  Lit  339  thousand  million  in  1987  to  Lit  907  thousand 
mil:ion  in  1990,  i.e.  12,9%  in relation  to  an  estimated turnover 
of Lit  7  040  thousand million. 
This  result,  taking  into  account  the  negative  prices/costs 
squeeze  effect  of  Lit  509  thousand  mi I I ion,  would  require  an 
over  a If  improvement  of  Lit  1  075  thousand  m  iII ion,  obtai  ned  as 
follows: 
22%  through closures  and  the  transfer  of certain activities; 
10%  by modifying  the volume  and  mix of certain  products; 
68%  by  improving  internal  management;  over  half  the 
improvement  witt  be obtained by  reducing  the workforce. 
All  the  measures  provided  for  in  the  plan  have been  checked  from 
the  standpoint  of  feasibility  and  their  impact  on  the  financial 
situation of  the undertaking. 
7.1.3 Overall,  and  in  taking  account  of  the  conservative  financial 
hypotheses  which  the  Commission  has  used  to  assess  viabi I ity. 
ILVA  should achieve  financial  viability by  1990. 
Nevertheless,  I LVA  wi II  even  then  only  form  part  of  the,  group 
of  Community  steel  producers  with  an  average  performance  and, 
like  these,  will  thus  continue  to  be  extremely  vulnerable  to - 73  -
unfavour  ab I  e  market  trends  in  a  context  where  overcapacity  in 
the Community  could be  lasting. 
7.2  Limiting  the aid  to  the bare minimum 
7 .2.1  Aid  for  financial  restructuring (Lit  6  932  thousand  mi II ion,  see 
pol nt  5. 1) 
The  amount  is  determined 
deducting  from  Finsider's 
mi II ion). 
by  the  Italian 
liabilities  (Lit 
Government  after 
10  030  thousand 
the  Income  from  the  transfer  of  some  of  Fins/der's  assets 
(Lit  1 500  thousand  mi Ilion); 
the  transfer  to  ILVA  of  part  of  Finsider's  liabilities 
(Lit  2  085  thousand million). 
The  Commission  will  not  be  able  to  determine  whether  the 
residual  amount  is  justified until  it has  verified: 
that  the selling price of  the  assets  are  realistic,  as  they 
may  exceed  the estimated  Lit  1 500  thousand million and  thus 
further  reduce  the  financing  required; 
the  !labilities  transferred  In  relation  to  the  transfers, 
which will  also reduce Flnslder's  financial  requirements; 
that  ILVA  will  effectively  be  required  to  bear  financial 
charges  of  4.5%,  which  could  mean  that  it  takes  over  a 
larger  proportion  of  Finsider's  liabilities  than  the 
Lit  2  085  thousand million provided  for  in  the  Plan. 
The  Commission  wi II  a/so  ensure  that  the  aids,  which  are 
intended  to  repay  the  debts  of  Finsider,  are  paid  to  a  blocked 
account  which  can  be  debited  only  for  that  purpose.  The  same 
will  apply  to  the  proceeds of  the  assets sold. - 14  -
7.2.2 Operating  aid (Lit  245  thousand million,  see point  5.3) 
The  Commission  considers 
amount  needed  to  cover 
that  the  aid  should  not  exceed  the 
the  requirements  of  the  provisional 
management  period,  which  must  be  shorter  than  envisaged  in  the 
Italian  plan. 
The  transfers  should  be  completed  by  the  end  of  the  first 
quarter  of  1989,  while  plant  which  cannot  be  sold  should  be 
closed  by  30  June  1989  at  the  latest.  The  Commission  may,  if 
met  w'~tl  well  founded  technical  reasons,  accord  a  short-term 
ex~ension of the  31  March  1989  closure deadline. 
As  regards  the special  case of Aosta,  provided  that  it  is not  sold 
or  operated  in  association  with  other  producers,  keeping  it  in 
operation  would  require  proof  of  its  financial  viability. 
Therefore,  if no  sale or  association  agreements  are  concluded  by 
30  June  1989,  the  Commission  will  examine  the  viabll ity prospects 
of  the  plant  which  will  have  to  be  closed  by  31.12.7989  if  the 
prospects  are  unfavourable.  Closures  of  steel  plant  already 
provided  for  in  the  plan  should  be  carried  out  before  the  end  of 
the  first  quarter  of  1989,  save  as  regards  the  I iquid  phase  of 
Bagnoli  which  can  be  kept  until  30  June  1989.  The  closures  at  the 
Campi  plant  (liquid  phase  and  heavy  plate mill),  the  liquid  phase 
at  Turin  and  the concrete reinforcing bars mill  at  the Terni  plant 
should  be  completed,  in  accordance  with  the  plan,  before  the  end 
of  1988. 
The  utilization  of  this  aid  should  therefore  be  extremely 
limited: 
-on  the  one  hand,  because  the  results  achieved  by  the 
installations  to  be  closed  or  sold  during  the  temporary 
management  period  should  be  better  than  expected  owing  to  the 
improved situation  in  the steel  market; - 15  -
-on  the  other  hand,  as  a  result  of  tightening  the  timetable  of 
closures  and  transfers,  as  required by  the Commission. 
7.2.3 Contingency  appropriation  (Lit  288  thousand  million,  see  point 
5.2) 
This  amount  w  iII  be  reI eased  on I y  on  a  case  by  case  basis, 
subject  to  justification. 
7.3  Reductions  in  production capacities 
AI though  it  might  seem  that  the  number  of  closures  is 
considerable  (1.18  million  tonnes  hot-rolled  capac(ty,  i.e.  in 
net  terms  8%  of  capacity6),  it  nevertheless  remains  that  in 
view  of  the  amount  of  aid  envisaged,  the  concessions  could 
appear  inadequate,  especially  in  the  I ight  of  the  concessions 
demanded  under  Decisions  2320/81/ECSC  and  1018185/ECSC. 
It  should  however  be  noted  that  the  present  restructuring 
follows  extensive  rationalization  of  the  pub/ ic  steel  industry 
(-23.6%  of  hot-rolled  capacity)  which  entailed  high  ·social 
costs·  (32.5%  of  job cuts) especially  in  disadvantaged  regions. 
7.4  Other  conditions 
7.4.1  Anxious  to  secure the  transparency not  provided by  the  system  of 
voluntary  winding-up  under  which  Finsider  is  .currently  being 
managed,  and  wishing  to  ensure,  in  ILVA's  interest  and  in  that 
of  its  competitors,  that  ILVA  takes  up  its duties  as  quickly  as 
possible,  the  Commission  will  also  make  its  authorization 
conditional  on  ownership  of  the  relevant  industrial  assets  and 
share  of  Finsider's  liabilities  being  transferred  to  the  new 
company  by  31~t March  1989. 
6  The  plan submitted by  the  Italian  authorities  does  not  foresee  any 
investment  which could  increase  the  production capacities. - 16  -
7.4.2 As,  furthermore,  this  is  an  exceptional  procedure  in  favour  of 
the  public  steel  industry  of  a  single  Member  State  which  has, 
moreover,  already  benefited  as  stated  above  from  considerable 
state  aid  in  the  past,  the  Commission  Decision  will  provide  for 
the  creation  of  a  system  for  monitoring,  In  particular,  of 
ILVA's  behaviour  as  regards  selling  pric,~s  and  the  development 
of  its  financial  position. 
V.  Conclusions 
8.  It  is  cl2~r.  therefore,  that  without  State  aid,  the  purpose  of 
which  .s  to  eliminate  loss-making  activities  in  the  Finsider 
G!  JUP  and  faci I itate  a  regrouping  of  the  most  viable  assets 
under  a  new  company,  ILVA,  Finsider  would  be  condemned  to  an 
untidy bankruptcy  and  the break-up of its assets. 
In  inviting  the  Council  to  approve  the  intention  to  adopt  a 
Commission  decision  under  Article  95(1)  of  the  ECSC  Treaty 
authorizing  the  financing  provided  for  in  the restructuring  plan 
of  the  Italian  public  steel  industry,  subject  to  the  limits  and 
conditions described  above,  the Commission  has  sought  to achieve 
a  balance  between  the need  for  fair  competition  in  the community 
market  and  the social,  regional  and  industrial  needs  now  arising 
In  Italy. 
The  Commission  will  also  present  this  communication  to  the 
Consultative  Committee  with  a  view  to  obtaining  its  opinion  in 
accordance with Article 95(1) of  the  ECSC  Treaty. 
The  adoption of such  a  Decision by  the Commission  will  enable  it 
to close  the Article 88  procedure. 
The  Commission  will  keep  the  Council  informed  of  the  progress 
made  in  the restructuring of  the  Italian  public steel  ind~stry. 